B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

158. From these statements I make reply to the second question [nn.133, 141]. To make it intelligible I posit an example: man is understood as rational animal, as substance, as tame, as noblest of animals. In the first sense he is understood according to his proper quidditative idea, in the second in a general way, in the third per accidens in a property, in the fourth in relation to something else. But the most perfect knowledge of man cannot be in relation to something else, because knowledge of relation presupposes knowledge of what is non-relational or absolute; nor can the most perfect knowledge be about man under the idea of a property, because knowledge of a property presupposes knowledge of the subject; nor can it be about man in general or universally, because that is confused or unspecific knowledge. Therefore the noblest cognition of man is according to his quidditative idea. Thus one could posit some science of God under the idea of relation to something extrinsic, in the way that some posit knowledge of him under the idea of repairer [cf. n.133], or of glorifier, or head of the Church [cf. n. 134]; or one could posit some science of God under the idea of some attribute, which is a sort of property, in the way that some posit that knowledge of God under the idea of good [cf. n.137] is this science; or one could posit some science of him under a general or universal idea [cf. n. 146-147], as under that of being, or infinite being, or necessary being, or some such thing.

159. Argument against all these positions.

First against the one about general idea, for no general concept asserted of God contains virtually all the properly theological truths that pertain to the plurality of persons; for if it did, since those general concepts are naturally conceived by us, then the immediate propositions about those concepts can be naturally known and understood by us, and through those immediate propositions we would be able to know the conclusions, and so acquire naturally the whole of theology.

160. Second, because since general concepts are not naturally known only to God, then neither are the truths included in those general concepts naturally known only to God; therefore theology, if it was of God under such a general concept, would not be naturally known only to God, the opposite of which was shown in the first question [n.

152].

161. Against the other position about the idea of attribute [n.158] one could argue through the same reasons, but I argue nevertheless through certain special reasons.

First, because cognition of a thing according to its essence is the most perfect cognition, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.1.1028a36-b2; therefore knowledge of God’s essence is a more perfect cognition of God than is knowledge of any attributable property which is related to his nature as a characteristic of it, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.4.

162. Second, because if those properties differ really from God’s essence, his essence would be really cause of them; therefore, just as they differ in idea from the essence, so the essence in its idea has the idea of being uncaused but these other properties, although, because of their identity with the essence, they are uncaused, yet, in their formal idea, do not include as a primary datum their own being uncaused.

163. Third, because that thing, according to its own proper idea, seems to be more actual in itself which has a greater repugnance to being communicable with many things extrinsic to it; but communicability with many things extrinsic to it is repugnant to essence in itself and not to any attributable property, except insofar as the property is of the essence, or is the same as that essence as infinite.

If it be said that any property is infinite and therefore incommunicable, on the contrary: its infinity is because of an infinity and identity with the essence as with the root source and foundation of every intrinsic perfection.

164. Against the way also about relations to what is extrinsic [n.158] one can make the same arguments as against the other two ways, but I have special reasons.

First, because relation to what is extrinsic is a relation of reason; but a science that does not consider its subject under its idea as real is not a science of real things, just as neither is logic a science of real things, although it considers things as having second intentions attributed to them; therefore theology would not be a science of real things, which is false.

165. Second, because what is absolute and what is relational do not form a concept that is per se one; therefore a concept that gathers these two into itself is a concept that is per accidens one. But no primary science is of a concept that is per accidens one, because such a concept presupposes the sciences of both its parts; and therefore, if a subalternate science is about anything that is per accidens one, it presupposes the two sciences that separately treat of the parts of the whole. Therefore if theology were of such a per accidens unity, there could be another science prior to it, which would be of a concept that is one per se.

166. Third, no relation to what is extrinsic is shown to belong necessarily to God;     therefore nothing theological will belong necessarily to God as he is the subject of theology, which is false. - Proof of the consequence: that which belongs to anything under a reason for inherence that is not necessary does not belong to it necessarily; but every relation to what is extrinsic is of this sort; therefore etc     . And thus no theological truth is necessary. And this conclusion is proved by the first and second reasons set down for the first question, namely about the idea of the first subject and about what is naturally known only by God.

167. I concede, therefore, the fourth member [n.158], that is, that theology is of God under the idea by which namely he is this essence, just as the most perfect science of man would be of man if it were of him as he is man, but not if it were of him under some universal or accidental idea.